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This paper develops a dynamic, general equilibrium model of
specialization-driven growth in which the private cost of coordination
among specialists is a function of public expenditures on physical and
institutional infrastructure.  Growth is characterized by endogenous
increases in labor specialization, capital per worker, market size, private
coordination costs and government’s share of total spending.  By
considering the role of government in facilitating an advanced division of
labor, the model provides an economic explanation for the secular rise of
government's share of output. 
JEL Classifications-  H100, O300, O4101
Section 1:  Introduction
While it is well known that government’s share of output has risen in industrialized
countries over the past century, this stylized fact has not found its way into the formal
literature on growth.  In part, this appears to be due to the ready availability of arguments
that attribute the rise in the government’s share of output to social and political causes.  In
Crisis and Leviathan (1987), for example, Higgs explains the rise of government in the
US in terms of a ratchet effect caused by the interaction of periodic crises and subsequent
institutional rigidity; Hughes (1993) suggests the impact of rising incomes on the taste for
redistributional policies.  In contrast, this paper examines the possibility that at least part
of the rise in the share of government spending can be explained in terms of the purely
economic role of the government in facilitating coordination in an economy with an
advanced division of labor.
Yang and Boreland (1991) and Becker and Murphy (1992) construct dynamic,
general equilibrium models in which growth is driven by the endogenous evolution of the
division of labor.
1  At the microanalytic heart of these models are agents faced with a
trade-off between increasing returns to specialization and costs of coordinating the
complex set of economic interactions arising from an advanced division of labor. 
This paper extends the literature on specialization-driven growth by developing a
model in which an agent’s private coordination costs depend on the provision of public
                                               
1Labor specialization has also been investigated in a variety of static contexts.  Rosen (1983), Barzel and
Yu (1984) and Edwards and Starr (1987) examine the incentive for labor specialization.  Baumgardner
(1988), Kim (1989) and Yang (1990) consider the equilibrium degree of labor specialization in static,
general equilibrium models. 2
services.  The model is used to examine the relationships between economic growth, the
division of labor and the role of government in the economy, including the possibility of a
virtuous cycle of growth driven by the evolution of the division of labor, capital
accumulation and increases in the provision of public services.
A reliance on steady-state analysis in the formal literature on government spending
and economic growth has also contributed to lack of attention to secular increases in
government’s share of output.
2  As the steady state is defined by the existence of constant
ratios in quantity variables over time, dynamic modeling exercises, such as Uzawa (1965),
Shell (1966) and Barro (1990), necessarily find that in the long run government
expenditure is a constant share of output.  Such as conclusion is, in fact, unavoidable: if in
the long run government spending grows faster than output, it will eventually exceed total
expenditure.  Given the experience of the US and other industrial countries, this suggests
that the “long run” of theoretical growth models must be very long and that to explain the
rise of government it is necessary to consider transitional dynamics.
3
Empirical support for the thesis that secular increases in government spending have
been driven by attempts to decrease coordination costs associated with advances in the
division of labor comes from Wallis and North’s (1986) analysis of the composition of
                                               
2 Though not explicitly included, a positive role for government may be inferred from the work of
theorists such as Arrow (1962), Lucas (1988) and Romer (1986, 1990), who assume the existence of
positive spillovers to certain investment activities and thus the divergence of private and social returns.
3 Though not beyond critique, recent empirical work based on the neoclassical growth model supports this
conclusion, regularly finding that countries and regions within a country converge toward their long run
growth paths at a rate of about 2 percent per year.  See Sala-i-Martin (1996) for a compilation of this
evidence.3
government expenditure in the US economy.  Wallis and North decompose government
spending into three categories in order to measure the size of the public transaction sector
defined as public spending on transaction-cost reducing services.  The first category
consists of those expenditures directly related to the enforcement of property rights, that is
expenditures on military, police and general government, and rose from 2.8 to 11.3
percent of GNP over the period from 1902 to 1970.
4
The second category is spending on social overhead capital, which includes
education, transportation and urban services.  These expenditures, they argue, are
indirectly linked to transaction costs.  Education, for example, aids in the "socialization
process regarding the legitimization of contracts," and urban services reduce the costs of
living in urban areas and thus serve to facilitate the division of labor.  If this second
category of public expenditures is included, the public transaction sector’s share of GNP
increased from 5.6 to 21.6 percent over the same period. 
The growth of these two categories of government spending suggests that
explanations of the rising share of government spending that rely entirely on an increase
taste for transfer payments are incomplete.  In addition, increases in government transfer
payments, Wallis and North’s third category of public spending, may also be regarded as
causally linked to increases in the division of labor if, as argued below, specialization
results in increased political pressure for redistributional policies by special interest
groups.  From 1902 to 1970 government transfer payments rose from 1.6 to12.1 percent
                                               
4See Wallis and North, Table 3.8, p.116.  As Wallis and North point out there is a certain degree of
ambiguity as to whether certain government expenditures should be included in the transaction sector. 
With the rise of the military-industrial complex, for example, some portion of military expenditure might
best be categorized as transfer payments.4
of GNP. 
Section 2:  The Division of Labor and the Economic Role of Government
In relation to the literature on specialization-driven growth, the primary theoretical
innovation in this model is the assumption that increases in the complexity of economic
organization increase the return to spending on public goods that reduce the private costs
of coordination.  This section presents several arguments regarding the relationship
between the division of labor, private coordination costs and government spending, which
are intended to motivate the relationships formalized in the coordination cost equation of
the model developed in the next section.  Broadly speaking, these arguments may be
characterized as belonging to the theories of efficient government -- statements regarding
the optimal provision of public goods -- and of inefficient government – statements
suggesting a relationship between advances in the division of labor and deviations from
optimal public policy. 
The first thesis regarding the relationship between specialization and optimal
government spending is that increases in the division of labor result in increases in the
return to government services that facilitate the coordination of economic activity.  In
particular, private coordination costs may depend negatively on the provision of public
goods.  For example, transportation and contract enforcement costs will be influenced by
the provision of transportation infrastructure and public institutions which define and
enforce property rights.
5  
                                               
5Increases in the division of labor will also provide an incentive for increases in the provision of private5
Second, increases in the division of labor result in the substitution of formal for
informal rules governing exchange and, consequently, increase the complexity and cost of
administration of the legal system.  According to North, "The move...from unwritten
traditions and customs to written laws has been unidirectional as we have moved from less
to more complex societies and is clearly related to the increasing specialization and
division of labor associated with more complex societies" (1990, p. 46).
North finds the theoretical underpinnings for this claim in game-theoretic
investigations of the conditions under which cooperation among individuals arises without
third party intervention.  In particular, a group's propensity for spontaneous cooperation is
found to depend negatively on group size (Hardin 1982), positively on the density of
social interactions (Taylor 1987), and negatively on the cost of obtaining information on
other players' preferences (Schofield, 1985).  Increases in the division of labor thus reduce
an economy's ability to rely on non-formal coordination mechanisms by 1) increasing the
number of individuals in each group (market or firm), 2) depersonalizing exchange by
decreasing the complexity of the social network with in which exchange takes place, and
3) increasing diversity among agents, which reduces each agent's knowledge of other
players’ preferences.
6
Third, increases in the division of labor lead to increases in the number and
intensity of external effects and, thus, increase the scope for positive government
intervention.  This thesis is based on two propositions.  The first is that the intensity of
                                                                                                                                                                    
services which reduce coordination costs.  See Dighe et al. (1990) for evidence regarding this effect. 
6The existence of professional codes of behavior and the segregation of cities into "neighborhoods" based
on class, race, ethnicity, religion and the like may be viewed in part as an attempt to reduce information
costs between agents.6
interpersonal spillover effects increases as the space between agents decreases.
7  Specific
examples include traffic congestion and air and noise pollution.  In general, however, the
statement requires only that an agent's actions have effects that extend beyond her in space
but with decreasing intensity. 
The second proposition is that certain transaction costs, notably transportation and
communication costs, may reasonably be thought of as decreasing in the space between
transacting agents.  As a result, increases in the gains to specialization will tend to increase
the incentive an agent has to reduce these costs by moving closer to others with whom she
has economic interactions, thereby increasing external diseconomies of propinquity.
8
While explicit treatment of political processes is beyond the scope of the formal
                                               
7.  As McCloskey (1998) points out, in reference to Coase’s (1960) example involving a railroad and a
farmer, this conception of external effects is somewhat different from the Pigovian one in that it is not
necessarily possible to determine which party is generating the externality, “the railway which makes the
sparks, or the farmers who plant imprudently close to the line.”  It is rather from their proximity that the
externality arises. 
8 While the formal model presented below does not include a spatial variable as one of the arguments of
the coordination cost function, in choosing how far from others to live, optimizing agents would balance
the marginal gains to specialization and the reduction of marginal transportation and communication
costs against the marginal disutility of interpersonal externalities and the increase in taxes to offset them. 
It follows that an increase in the gains to specialization would result in a decrease in the equilibrium
distance between agents, an increase in the strength of interpersonal spillover effects, and greater per
capita government spending due to an increase in the marginal gains of government intervention relative
to the marginal costs.  Note that the existence of interpersonal spillover effects is consistent with optimal
specialization decisions: agents are likely to include the psychic costs of urban living in the decision to
move to a city. 7
analysis presented below, there are two arguments for believing that political outcomes
become increasingly inefficient, from a social point of view, as the division of labor
increases.  First, it should be noted that as an economy develops the division of labor
cannot be expected to proceed evenly within a given country.  Transaction costs are not
uniform across space, for example due to differences in geography such as the presence of
 mountains, deserts or rivers, which affect transportation costs.  In addition, the gains to
specialization may differ across economic activities, as Smith (1976) suggests regarding
agriculture and industry.
9 
As a result, the rate at which larger trading groups, and by association larger social
units such as towns and cities, emerge will vary across geographic regions and sectors of
the economy.  Consequently, those changes in the structure of values associated with the
emergence of larger trading groups and social units, which may be referred to collectively
as modernization, will also proceed at different rates.  This in turn will tend to increase the
divisiveness of public life as the conflict between traditional and emerging value structures
is played out in the political arena.
10 
A second factor leading to decreasing efficiency of the public sector derives from
Olson's work on the role of special interest groups.  According to Olson political rigidities
                                               
9For a model of specialization-driven urbanization in which transaction costs are higher in agriculture, see
Yang (1990).
10A particular example of this is the on-going public debate over the set of ideas and values associated
with the term "feminism."  As Yang and Boreland (1991) illustrate, increases in the gains to
specialization decrease the incentive for household production, and may thus be seen as one of the factors
contributing to increased female participation in the labor force.  The association of pro- and anti-feminist
stances with modern and traditional values is also clearly marked in the rhetoric of the debate.8
in advanced societies are due to the accumulation of distributional coalitions, which tends
to increase "the complexity of regulation, the role of government, and the complexity of
understandings," i.e. formal and informal contracts (1982, p. 74).  First introduced in his
analysis of collective action (Olson, 1971), distributional coalitions are groups of
individuals who share a common economic interest and act to further that interest through
influencing public decision making to redistribute income in their favor.  
Due to the collective nature of the benefits derived by the members of a
distributional coalition, collective action faces free-rider problems similar to those
associated with public goods.  An important implication is that distributional coalitions are
easier to form when the number of potential beneficiaries is small.  Since redistributional
policies tend to distort relative prices and thereby reduce national income, the range of
redistributional policies a redistributional group will advocate depends (inversely) on how
"encompassing" it is, as measured by its share of national income.  For example, a group
that receives half of the national income will not pursue policies that reduce national
income by more than two dollars for every dollar of redistribution; a group that receives
one third of national income would favor policies that reduce national income by as much
as three dollars per dollar redistributed. 
Olson attributes the gradual accumulation of distributional coalitions over time to
the relatively high costs and uncertainty involved in coalition formation.  When viewed
through the lens of increasing specialization, however, a more deterministic theory of the
formation and impact of coalitions may be proposed.  As labor specialization proceeds
professions become more numerous and more narrowly defined.  Given that members of a
given profession have common economic interests, this will tend to increase both the9
number of potential redistributional coalitions and reduce each profession's share of
national income, making it less encompassing and thus willing to pursue policies more
damaging to the economy at large.  If the rate of increase of labor specialization outpaces
the growth of the workforce, increases in the division of labor will also tend to decrease
the number of individuals in a given profession, which reduces the costs of coalition
formation and facilitates coordination within the coalition once formed.
11
Seen in this light, Olson's theory of distributional coalitions is an extension of the
more general proposition that the division of labor increases the cost of coordination
within an economy to the political marketplace.  In addition, it necessarily places the
analysis within the world of the second best.  With suboptimal decisions regarding
infrastructure investments and legal arrangements in the public sector of the economy, the
costs of coordinating the division of labor will be higher than they would under optimal
provision of public services.  As it is also likely that agents’ specialization decisions do not
take into account their impact on the efficiency of the political process, over-specialization
will tend to occur. 
As the formal analysis presented below does not consider the possibility of non-
optimal public decision making, these last two theses are not captured by the model. 
Symmetry across agents and activities implies that specialization proceeds evenly over all
agents.  The model, therefore, cannot be used to examine the implications of conflict
                                               
11There may be limits to the positive effects of reduced coalition size on coalition formation and
effectiveness.  In particular, if there are fixed costs to formation or lobbying, these costs must be spread
among coalition members, and the benefits of membership must exceed these costs in order for the
coalition to continue to exist.  See Krauts (1998) on the fragmentation and decline of professional
associations in the US and Europe.10
between emerging and traditional value systems.  A second implication of symmetry is that
coalition formation takes place in all professions at a single point in time and affects the
provision of public services in a symmetric manner, reducing the efficiency of public inputs
but not distorting the relative prices of private goods. 
Section 3: The Static Model
3.1  Basic Equations
There are N ex ante identical individuals, each with an exogenously given stock of
capital, h, and a continuum of productive tasks arranged along the unit interval.  There is a
one-to-one relationship between tasks and intermediate goods, and the (measure of the)
range of tasks undertaken by an individual is n.  Labor specialization is denoted by the
variable s, which is assumed to be inversely related to n, s = 1/n.  That is, a worker is more
specialized if she concentrates her productive efforts on an narrower range of tasks. 
Following Rosen (1983) and Young (1928), increasing returns to specialization are
assumed to arise from the use of specialized capital in the production of intermediate
goods.  By concentrating her investment resources and work effort on a limited range of
intermediate goods, a worker increases the utilization rate of specialized capital and, thus,
the return to capital and per capita output. 
Each worker allocates her resources evenly among the tasks she undertakes and
produces the same quantity of each intermediate good.  Output per capita, defined as the
sum of intermediate good outputs, is increasing in the degree of labor specialization and11
capital per worker. We have
(1) y = y(s, h),
where  y(s, 0) = 0,
ys(s, h) > 0,
yh(s, h) > 0,
yss(s, h) < 0,
yhh(s, h) < 0,
yhs(s, h) > 0 and
0 £ s £ 1.
The derivatives of equation (1) imply that per capita output is increasing and
subject to diminishing returns in both labor specialization and the capital-labor ratio, and
that the marginal product of capital is increasing in labor specialization.  These
assumptions are consistent with parametric equations for per capita output derived by
Rosen (1983) and Becker and Murphy (1992) under the assumption that intermediate
goods are produced using specialized capital goods.
12
Intermediate goods are assumed to be complements in the production of a
composite good that may be used either for consumption or investment. One unit of the
composite good is produced in Leontief fashion by combining one unit of each of the
intermediate goods.  A worker may produce the full range of intermediate goods and
                                               
12 See also the derivation of per capita output in Appendix A1, which assumes intermediate goods are
produced using Cobb-Douglas technology with diminishing marginal returns to task-specific capital.12
combine them to produce the composite good.
13  Alternately, she may specialize in the
production of a subset of intermediate goods, in which case she must coordinate her
production with other specialists in order to produce the final good.
The presence of positive gains to specialization implies that, in order to generate
non-boundary solutions for the equilibrium degree of labor specialization, it is necessary to
abandon the standard assumption that markets and firms function costlessly to coordinate
production.  The alternative assumption, that the coordination of economic activity is
costly, implies that agents face a trade-off between the gains to specialization and the cost
of coordination. 
Coordination costs may arise for a variety of reasons.  The emphasis in Adam
Smith (1976) is on transportation costs, which he uses to explain the relative
backwardness of inland Asia and Africa and a low division of labor among Scottish
farmers, and on legal barriers to exchange, to which he ascribes the (reputed) stationarity
of China.  Becker and Murphy (1992) cite the recent work on principal-agent conflicts and
free-rider problems as a source of coordination costs.  Arrow (1974) and Coase (1937)
argue that information costs associated with market transactions rise with increases in the
number of transactors.  Coase (1937) and Williamson (1975) call attention to the
bureaucratic costs of coordinating production within firms, and Williamson (1979) stresses
the role of imperfect contracting as an impediment to the coordination of production
between firms.  In each of these cases, coordination costs are increasing in the division of
labor.
                                               
13 The cost of combining intermediate goods is assumed to be zero.  Equivalently, it is assumed that
agents costlessly coordinate their own production so that c(1, g) = 0 in equation (2) below. 13
A group of agents who coordinate their production will be called a team.  The
number of team members, m, is thus associated with Smith's notion of the extent of the
market, and increases in team membership are taken to be indicative of the emergence of
larger social groupings such as towns and cities.  Positive coordination costs imply that
teams will consist of agents who produce non-overlapping sets of intermediate goods.  It
follows that team membership is given by m = 1/n = s.  Integer problems regarding the
number of agents in a team are ignored.
As argued in the previous section, private coordination costs will be decreasing in
the provision of public goods.  It remains to be determined what measure of government
services is used in determining per capita coordination costs.  As Barro (1990) points out,
the correct measure of the government services available to a given agent will be per
capita rather than total government expenditure if public goods are rivalrous.  The
prevalence of congestible public goods (highways, courts, and the like) suggests that per
capita government expenditures, which is used here, may be the better measure.
14 
The function governing per capita coordination costs is given by
(2)  c = c(s, g),
cs(s, g) > 0,
css(s, g) > 0,
cg(s, g) < 0,
cgg(s, g) > 0 and
                                               
14 With a fixed population, use of total government expenditure would influence the results of the model
only through the introduction of a constant.14
csg(s, g) < 0,
where g is per capita government spending.  The derivatives in (2) imply that coordination
costs are increasingly increasing in labor specialization, that successive increases in
government spending reduce coordination costs but with diminishing effect, and that an
increase in labor specialization increases the return to the provision of public goods.
Finally, it is assumed that the government maintains a balanced budget at every
point in time, so that the government budget constraint is
(3)  g = t,
where t is per capita lump sum tax revenues. 
Workers are assumed to maximize net per capita income, z, which is per capita
income less taxes and coordination costs.  In determining equilibrium in the static model,
the capital-labor ratio is taken as given, and both s and g are assumed to be chosen
optimally. 
Employing (3), the representative agent's optimization problem is, thus, given by
(4)  max  z(s, g, h) = y(s, h) - g - c(s, g)
s, g
subject to  1 £ s £ N,
g ³ 0.
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for maximization with respect to s and g are,15
respectively,
(5a) s ³ 1, ys - cs £ 0 and (s-1)(ys - cs) = 0
or
(5b) s £ N, ys - cs ³ 0 and (s-N)(ys - cs) = 0,
and
(6) g  ³ 0, -1 - cg  £ 0 and g(-1 - cg) = 0.
Let AA and BB, shown in Figure 1, denote the schedules defined by (5) and (6) in
the s-g plane.  For values of g for which the lower (upper) constraint on s is binding, the
AA schedule consists of a vertical line at s = 1 (s = N).  For intermediate values of g,
agents choose s by equating the marginal gains to specialization, ys(s, h), with marginal
cost of coordinating the division of labor.  Above AA, marginal gain to specialization
exceed marginal costs, and below AA marginal costs exceed marginal gains.
Differentiating dz/ds = 0 with respect to s and g indicates that for 1 £ s £ N the
slope of the AA schedule is given by


















Figure 1a: Stable Equilibrium at (s*, g*)17
where the sign follows from (1) and (2).  The logic behind (7) is that, starting in
equilibrium, an increase in government spending decreases the marginal costs of
specialization, so that at the initial value of s the marginal gains now exceed marginal
costs.  An increase in s is therefore necessary to re-equate the costs and gains to
specialization. 
Equation (6) implies that optimal positive government spending occurs when an
additional dollar of tax revenue and government spending reduces coordination costs by
one dollar.  Since small teams may coordinate their production without resorting to third
party intervention, it is assumed that the benefits of government spending in reducing
coordination costs are less than one until a threshold level of specialization, s0, is reached,
and thus that optimal government spending is zero for s < s0.  Beyond this threshold value
of s, the slope of the BB schedule is found by differentiating dz/dg = 0 with respect to g
and s, implying 
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where the sign follows from (2).  An increase in specialization increases the return to the
provision of public goods in reducing coordination costs, implying that the benefits of
additional taxation and government spending exceed the costs.  Since the BB schedule is
monotonic and invariant in h, we can define the equilibrium value of g as a function of s,
g* = g*(s), such that [s, g*(s)] Î BB.18
3.2 Existence and Stability of Equilibria
If the AA and BB schedules intersect, indicated in Figure 1 by (s*, g*), the
intersection will be an equilibrium provided the second order conditions of the agent's
maximization problem (4) are met.
15  These are
(9a)  d
2z/ds
2 =  yss - css < 0,
(9b) d
2z/dg








2 = -cgg(yss - css) - cgs
2  > 0.
(9a) and (9b) hold from our assumptions regarding the derivatives of (1) and (2). 
We know from (7) that an increase in government spending increases the optimal
degree of specialization and from (8) that an increase in specialization increases optimal
government spending.  The condition in (9c) implies that the interaction between these
two effects is bounded.  If (9c) is not met, (s*, g*) is a saddle point for z(s, g, h).  In this
case, optimal specialization occurs at one of the endpoints implying that equilibrium values
of (s, g) are then given by (1, g*(1)) or (N, g*(N)).  Since
-cgg(yss - css) - cgs
2 = -cggcsg(dg/ds|A - dg/ds|B) and -cggcsg > 0,
(9c) is satisfied provided AA is steeper than BB at (s*, g*).  Unless otherwise specified, it
                                               
15There is, of course, nothing in the analysis or in our assumptions that precludes the existence of multiple
equilibria, which will occur if the AA and BB schedules intersect more than once.  Statements about the
curvature of AA and BB, however, depend upon third and higher order derivatives of the objective
function about which it is difficult to make reliable assumptions. 19
is assumed hereafter that (9c) holds.
At any equilibrium, the economy may be categorized according to its position on
the BB curve as determined by the value of h and the functions y(..) and c(..).  It is useful
to define h0, h1 and h2 as follows
(10) h0:y s(1, h0) - cs(1, 0) = 0
h1:y s(s0, h1) - cs(s0, 0) = 0
h2:y s(N, h2) - cs(N, g*(N)) = 0
It follows that for h £ h0 the AA curve lies entirely above BB for s > 1, corresponding to
an autarchic equilibrium at (s*, g*) = (1, 0).  In autarchy, each agent produces the full
range of intermediate goods and is economically independent.  In addition, in the absence
of specialization coordination costs are zero and there is no government.
For h Î [h0, h1], the equilibrium lies on the flat portion of BB, corresponding to a
traditional economy.  Traditional economies are characterized by the existence of many
small teams, low-levels of the division of labor and the absence of government, social
groups being sufficiently small for coordination of rely on informal enforcement
mechanisms.
For h Î (h1, h2), the equilibrium lies on the upward sloping portion of the BB
curve.  In this case, the economy consists of N/s* teams of m = s* individuals, and
positive government spending.  Along this portion of the BB curve, labor specialization is
positively related to team size and per capita government spending and negatively related
to the number of teams.  Greater specialization results in greater economic integration20
interdependence among agents and increases in the role of government in reducing private
coordination costs.
16  These equilibria are interpreted as corresponding to an
industrializing economy. 
Finally, for h > h2, the AA curve lies entirely below the BB curve.  Specialization is
constrained by population size rather than the cost of coordinating the division of labor,
implying an equilibrium at (s*, g*) = (N, g*(N)).  In this case the economy is fully
integrated and consists of a single team, corresponding to a mature economy.
                                               
16 Economic integration predicted by the model may also play a role in the centralization of government. 
Hughes (1993) reports that since 1929 in the US total government spending has grown 4 times as fast as
GNP while spending by the federal government has grown 7 times as fast, rising from 3 percent of GNP
in 1929 to between 20 and 25 percent of GNP in 1987.  
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3.3  Comparative Statics
As illustrated in Figure 2, an exogenous increase in the capital stock shifts the AA
curve down and to the right.  Comparative statics are, then,
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2
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17
Starting in autarchy and allowing h to increase, specialization begins at h = h0. 
With further increases in the capital-labor ratio, specialization and the gains to third party
enforcement of contracts rise, with government formation occurring at h = h1.  Additional
increases in h result in increases in labor specialization, the interdependence of agents and
per capita government spending until h = h2, after which the division of labor is
                                               
17See Appendix A2 for derivation.22
constrained by the size of the population and increases in the capital-labor ratio affect
neither g nor s.
The second line of (11a) shows the horizontal shift in the AA curve and, thus, the
increase in s in the absence of government.  This effect will be larger the more sensitive
the gains to specialization are to the capital-labor ratio.  In addition, the effect will be large
when the difference in the rates of increase of marginal costs and returns to specialization
is small, since this implies that a large change in s is necessary to restore the balance
between the marginal costs and marginal gains to specialization. 
Since government spending may be used to offset rising coordination costs, the
impact of a given change in h will be larger in an industrializing than a traditional
economy. This may be seen by noting that the third line of (11a) is the horizontal shift in




















which is greater than 1 given our assumption regarding the relative slopes of the AA and
BB curves.  This term captures the positive interaction between specialization and optimal
government spending, an interaction which is absent in the second line of (11a) since
government spending is constrained at 0.  This effect will be larger the greater csg, which
indicates the magnitude of the reduction in coordination costs due to an increase in
government spending.
Rearranging terms in (11b), we see that for h Î [h1, h2] the increase in government
spending is given by
dg*/dh = 0() ( ) dh ds
B / * dg/ds .23
Here, both terms are increasing csg, indicating that the effect of an increase in the capital-
labor ratio on government spending is larger the greater the effectiveness of government
spending in reducing marginal coordination costs. 
Section 4: Endogenous Growth and the Rise of Government
This section introduces an informal dynamic model to consider the evolution of the
economy through time.  In addition, we derive the conditions under which government
spending grows as a share of output and note the relationship between the growth of
government and diminishing marginal returns.
4.1 Endogenous Growth
By allowing the final composite good to be either invested or consumed and
positing agents with an infinite time horizon, the static model developed in Section 3 may
be extended to consider issues of economic growth.  Of primary interest here are the
ability of the model to generate endogenous and the role of increasing government
spending in this process.  This contrasts with the main line of endogenous growth theory
which has argued that the special properties of either knowledge or human capital make
the assumption of diminishing marginal returns to capital inappropriate.
An informal dynamic model is constructed by assuming that the rate of investment
conforms to the following function:24
(12)  dh/y = f[z'(h)-q],
where f'(..) > 0, q > 0 is the discount rate and z(h) = z[s*(h), g*(h), h].  
Equation (12) captures two properties of investment functions resulting from
dynamic utility maximization exercises with an isoelastic utility function.  First, investment
is a positive function of the difference between the marginal product of capital and the
discount rate, which is the familiar Keynes-Ramsey rule.  The second property,
consumption smoothing over time, implies the gradual adjustment of the capital-labor ratio
to its equilibrium value.
18  It follows from equation (12) that the model generates
endogenous growth if the marginal product of capital is greater than the discount rate and
increasing in the capital-labor ratio.
The growth process is driven by mutually reinforcing increases in the capital-labor
ratio and the division of labor.  A rise in the capital-labor ratio has both direct and indirect
effects on the marginal product of capital.  The direct effect, due to the presence of
diminishing marginal returns to capital, is negative.  The indirect effect results from the
impact of capital accumulation on labor specialization and that of labor specialization on
the marginal product of capital. 
Recall that the gains to specialization derive from the fact that specialization allows
agents to concentrate their capital endowment and working time on a narrower range of
tasks increasing both capital per task and the utilization rate of task-specific capital.  As a
result, the return to capital is increasing in the degree of specialization.  In addition, as
shown in the first part of this section, the equilibrium degree of specialization is rising in
                                               
18For use of a similar reduced-form investment equation, see Becker, Murphy and Tamura (1992). 25
the capital-labor ratio.
19  Thus, an increase in the capital-labor ratio increases the gains to
specialization, resulting in a higher equilibrium degree of specialization and an increase in
the marginal product of capital.
If the indirect effect is sufficiently strong to offset diminishing marginal returns to
capital, the marginal product of capital will be increasing in the capital-labor ratio.  A
precise statement of this condition is given by 
(13)   h)   (s*, y -   >  
dh
* ds







The right hand side of (13) is a measure of the strength of diminishing marginal
returns to capital.  The left hand side shows the indirect effect to be the product of the
marginal increase in the return to capital due to an increase in the degree of labor
specialization and the increase in the equilibrium degree of labor specialization due to an
increase in the capital-labor ratio, as derived in equation (11a).  Thus, the model exhibits
aggregate increasing returns provided the interaction between capital accumulation and
economies of specialization is strong relative to the effects of diminishing marginal returns
to capital. 
The dynamic evolution of the economy is determined by the range of values of h
for which the condition in (13) is met.  Clearly, (13) fails to hold for autarchic and mature
                                               
19Mathematically, the increase in the return to specialization due to an increase in the capital labor ratio
and the increase in the marginal product of capital due to an increase in labor specialization are identical,
given by -ynh(n, h) and -yhn(n, h), respectively.
20See Appendix B3 for derivation.26
economies since ds*/dh, and thus the left hand side of (13), is zero.  Consequently, the
model is dominated by diminishing marginal returns to capital for h < h0 and h > h2. 
One possibility is that (13) holds for h Î [h0, h2].  In this case, the model exhibits
increasing marginal returns to capital for h Î [h0, h2].  Defining q0 = z'(h0) and q2 = z'(h2),
the model has up to three equilibria as follows:
(14a)  q > q2   one stable equilibrium at hL 
(14b) q Î [q0, q2] stable equilibria at hL and hH
one unstable equilibrium at hU
(14c) q < q0 one stable equilibrium at hH, 
where hL = z'(q)
-1, for hL < h0,
hU = z'(q)
-1, for hU Î [h0, h2],
 h H = z'(q)
-1, for hH > h2.
Here hL is a stable low-level equilibrium occurring in autarchy, and hH is a stable high-level
equilibrium in a mature economy.  hU is a threshold level of the capital-labor ratio below
which the economy is driven to the low-level equilibrium.  Figure 3.1 shows these
equilibria given q Î [q0, q2]. 
Since an increase in government spending may be used to offset rising coordination
costs, ds*/dh will tend to be greater once government formation begins at h1.  A second
possibility is, thus, that the marginal product of capital decreases over [h0, h1] with
increasing returns over h Î [h1, h2].  The implications of this case differ from that
discussed above only in that the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a
low-level equilibrium is q > q1 = z'(h1).  Provided this condition is met, the low-level27
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Figure 3c: Case 3 Stable and Unstable Equilibria, q Î(q1, q2 )
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equilibrium may occur at any value of h < h1, as shown in figure 3.2.  That is, both
autarchic and traditional economies may experience low-level equilibria.
In these cases, both specialization and per capita government expenditures will
increase as growing economy approaches complete specialization.  Once the capital-labor
ratio reaches h2, however, specialization is limited by population size.  With a fixed
division of labor, coordination costs cease to increase and, as a result, agents have no
incentive to increase per capita government expenditure.  As additional increases in the
capital-labor ratio cause per capita output to rise, government expenditure declines as a
share of total output as a completely specialized economy approaches the high-level
equilibrium. 
A third possibility is that increases in the division of labor decrease the
effectiveness of government spending in reducing coordination costs.  In this case, the
model may be used to illustrate a version of Olson’s argument that the accumulation of
distributional coalitions leads to a deceleration of economic growth and eventual economic
stagnation.
21  As argued earlier, the number of potential coalitions, the ease of coalition
formation and the divisiveness of coalitions in public life are likely to increase with the
division of labor as the number of individuals in each profession decreases and professions
become less encompassing. 
Decreases in the ability of the public sector to facilitate the coordination of
economic activity reduce the magnitude of the indirect effect in equation (13), eventually
resulting in the onset of diminishing marginal returns to capital and undermining the
                                               
21This is only a "version" because it ignores significant elements of Olson's argument, most significantly
the possibility of non-optimal political outcomes, non-symmetries in the impact of coalitions on public
policy and other mechanisms through which coalitions affect economic outcomes, e.g. price fixing.29
virtuous cycle of growth due to increases in the division of labor, capital accumulation and
increases in the provision of public goods. 
More specifically, assume
(15a) lim (s ® ¥) csg[s, g*(s)] = 0







(15c) hH = z'(q)
-1, for hH Î(hU, h2).
(15a) and (15b) imply that the absolute value of csg(s, g) falls as s increases and that
increases in government spending are necessary to generate increasing marginal returns to
capital, so that diminishing marginal returns hold for h < h1 and h > hD, where hD is defined
implicitly by equality in equation (13).  (15c) implies that specialization is limited by
diminishing returns to the provision of public goods prior to complete specialization, and
thus that the high-level equilibrium occurs at hH < h2 as indicated in figure 3.3.
Diminishing marginal returns may, of course, set in for reasons other than the
decreasing ability of governments to reduce private coordination costs through additional
public spending.  For example, if the stock of knowledge is fixed it may place a limit on
the accumulation of specialized human capital goods and, thus, on the gains to
specialization beyond some level of the capital-labor ratio.  More generally, diminishing
returns may result from any factor that causes the left-hand side of (13) to fall relative to
the right.  The explanation of diminishing marginal returns outlined above, however, is
important because it coincides with the explanation for economic sclerosis in mature30
economies provided by informed observers.
While the model does not explicitly solve for the rate of growth at any point in
time, it is possible to make qualitative statements regarding growth rates.  In the steady
states indicated by the high and low-level equilibria, the division of labor is constant and
the economy stationary.  Outside the steady state, the rate of per capita income growth is
a positive function of the difference between the return to capital and the discount rate. 
This owes to two effects: a higher return to capital implies 1) a greater share of investment
in output, as indicated by equation (12), and 2) a greater increase in per capita output per
incremental increase in the capital-labor ratio.  As a result, the model predicts that middle
income countries will grow the faster than rich countries or poor countries, a prediction
that is consonate, in a broad manner, with the observed pattern of growth rates across
countries.
22
4.2: On the Shares of Government Expenditure and Coordination Costs in Output
Here, we consider the conditions under which the share of government spending
and of coordination costs rise in a growing economy.  As the dynamics of the model are
driven by capital accumulation, this is accomplished by comparing the elasticities of
government expenditure, coordination costs and output with respect to the capital-labor
                                               
22 A review of the empirical work on growth is beyond the scope of this paper.  However, it should be
noted that both the neoclassically motivated empirical literature on growth, for example Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (1992), Mankiw, Romer and Wiel (1992) and Sala-i-Martin (1996), and the more recent work on
convergence clubs, for example Quah (1996), suggest that poor countries are converging toward low-level
equilibria while middle income countries catch up with rich ones.31
ratio.  This task is simplified by imposing two additional restrictions on the model. 
First, we assume that per capita output is a Cobb-Douglas function of h and s with
output elasticities a º h(y, s) and b º h(y, h),







.  Second, it is assumed that c(s, g) is
homogeneous of degree r >1 in s and g.  The second assumption implies that for a given
increase in s, a more than proportionate increase in government spending is necessary to
reduce coordination costs to their initial level.  This would tend to hold, for example, if
increases in the division of labor undermine informal coordination mechanisms.
An increase in the capital-labor ratio will increase the shares of government and
coordination costs in total output, respectively, provided
(16a) h(g, s)B = - 
g) , c (
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Here, (16a) implies that cross elasticities are strong relative to own elasticities.
23 
                                               
23The second order condition for an internal maximum given by (9c) implies a limit on the magnitude of












Intuitively, it will be satisfied provided government spending is relatively effective at
reducing coordination costs.  (16b) holds due to r > 1.
24
Interestingly, further manipulation reveals that the model does not suggest a causal
relationship between the growth of the public sector and the onset of diminishing returns. 
In fact, while there is nothing in the model that precludes the possibility that increases in
government's share of expenditure coincide with the onset of diminishing marginal returns,
the two tend to be inversely related.  The conditions under which the share of government
increases and the economy experiences diminishing marginal returns are, respectively,
(17a) h(g, s)B h(s, h) > ah(s, h) + b
and
(17b) 1 > ah(s, h) + b
where (17b) is the counterpart to (13) restated in terms of elasticities.  Ceteris parabus, 
(17a) will tend to hold when the elasticity of specialization with respect to the capital-
labor ratio, h(s, h), is large, and (17b) when it is small. 
This result is due to two characteristics of the model.  First, the use of lump sum,
rather than marginal, taxes precludes the growth of government spending having a direct
effect on the marginal product of capital.  More importantly, the assumption that the level
of government spending is chosen optimally implies that agents choose higher levels of
government spending only if the marginal productivity of public spending is relatively high.
 As a result, a decrease in the productivity of public goods will tend to reduce the growth
                                               
24 See Appendix B2 for derivations.33
rates of both output and government spending.
25
Section 5: Conclusion
The principle focus of this paper has been to develop a formal model of economic
growth capable of explaining the secular growth of government in developed countries.  In
doing so, it departs from the familiar assumptions that markets function costlessly and that
the institutional context within which market transactions occur may be taken as given and
relegated to the background.  Instead, the model assigns an explicit role for the
government in providing the physical and institutional infrastructure necessary to
coordinate economic activity involving an advanced division of labor.  Thus, the economic
role of government spending is placed in the foreground, with optimal public spending at
each point in time determined endogenously, along with labor specialization, by the
structure of the production and coordination cost functions and the capital-labor ratio.
                                               
25 It is, however, possible for both (17a) and (17b) to be satisfied, a sufficient condition for which is
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The first inequality is from (12) and implies that an increase in the capital-labor ratio increases
government's share of output.  The second is a sufficient condition for (17b) to be satisfied provided the
first inequality holds and, as expected, will tend to hold when b is small, implying that diminishing
marginal returns to capital set in quickly, and the gains to specialization, a, are small.34
The dynamic model developed in Section 4 produces stable low-level equilibria in
autarchic and traditional economies and stable high-level equilibria in economies with
complete specialization or an advanced division of labor.  As I have shown in a similar
model (under review for publication), the “sideways-S” shaped function for the return to
capital generated by the model is consistent with divergence between high and low income
countries and convergence on the part of middle income countries.
The model also produces the somewhat curious outcome that the growing share of
government expenditure is not the result of diminishing returns to public goods in
defraying private coordination costs.  As suggested at the end of the last section, this
probably owes to the assumption of optimality in public spending decisions.  By
implication, if the rising share of government spending in mature economies is related to
their declining rate of growth, the explanation would seem to belong to the theory of
inefficient government, such as the link between specialization and the impact of
distributive coalitions discussed above. 
The approach used here employs much of the conceptual framework of
neoinstitutionalist economics.  Both are primarily concerned with issues of complexity and
coordination in economic life, employ a "nano-economic" analytical framework which
takes the individual economic transaction as the fundamental unit of analysis, and posit a
central role for transaction costs in understanding the organization of economic activity. 
An important difference is that the central focus of neoinstitutionalist attention has
been structure of individual transactions, in particular whether a given transaction is best
organized through the market or within a firm.  The analysis here takes as its subject the
organization of economy as a whole and, more importantly, the evolution of organization35
over time.  In addition, while the neoinstitutionalists may be interpreted as saying that
“transaction costs matter,” the model developed here suggests why they are important. 
Transaction costs matter because coordination matters, and coordination matters because
of gains to the division of labor. 
Appendix A1
This appendix derives a parametric function for per capita output using a Cobb-
Douglas production function for intermediate goods with specific inputs.  The parametric
function is shown to support the assumptions made in Section 3 regarding the signs of the
derivatives of equation (1). 
Let the set of tasks undertaken by an individual be given by S Í [0, 1].  The





where ba = 1 if a Î S and 0 otherwise.
There is a one-to-one relationship between tasks and intermediate goods:
performing a task produces a quantity, ya, of the intermediate good of the same index
number.  Intermediate goods are produced according to a Cobb-Douglas production
function with arguments ta and ha, which are respectively the time and capital allocated to
task a:
(A1) ya = Ata
aha
b,36
where a, b Î (0, 1) and are uniform across tasks.
Each individual is endowed with a single unit of time and h units of capital which is
allocated evenly among tasks.  Defining the degree of specialization s º 1/n implies ta = s,
ha = sh and ya = As
(a+b)h
b, for all a in S.  Per capita output, y, is found by integrating, ya
over S:
(A2) y =   da ya
S aò
Î
= ya/s = As
(a+b-1)h
b.
Equation (A2) implies that per capita output exhibits increasing returns to
specialization provided the exponent on s is negative, that is provided task-production
exhibits increasing returns to scale: a+b > 1.  Assuming this condition is met, equation
(A2) can be used to generate the following derivatives, which form the basis of
assumptions regarding pre capita output in equation (1):
(A3) dy/dh > 0, d
2y/dh
2 < 0,






This appendix derives equations (11a) and (11b).  To begin with, note that
equilibrium is given by (s*, g*) = (1, 0), for h < h0, so ds*/dh and dg*/dh are obviously
zero.  A similar argument shows dg*/dh = ds*/dh = 0 for h > h2.  In addition, h1 is defined
such that it is the greatest value of h for which g = 0.  Consequently, dg/dh = 0 for h < h1.
 With dg/dh constant, it follows that for h Î (h0, h1), ds*/dh may be found by






Finally, the third line of (11a) and first line of (11b) are found by solving the
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and the sign of D follows from (9c).
Appendix B1
This appendix derives equation (13).  As argued in the body of the paper, for the
model to generate endogenous growth the marginal net product of capital must be non-
decreasing in the capital-labor ratio.  An equivalent condition is that the second derivative
of net output with respect to h is non-negative.  Differentiating z(h) = z[s*(h), g*(h), h]
twice with respect to h, we have
(B1) z"(h) = yhh + 2s'(h)ysh + {yss - css}s'(h) - 2csg g'(h)s'(h) -cgg g'(h)
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2 '( )  = -s'(h)ysh ,
from we get z"(h) = yhh + s'(h)ysh and the inequality in (13).
Appendix B2
This appendix derives the inequalities in (16a), (16b) and footnote 24.  We start
with the assumption made in the body of the paper that that per capita output is a Cobb-
Douglas function of h and s with output elasticities a º h(y, s) and b º h(y, h), where a, b







.  This implies the following elasticities
(B3) h(yh, s) = a
h(ys, s) = a-1
h(ys, h) = b
h(yh, h) = b-1
From (11), it follows that the elasticities of government spending, coordination
costs and output with respect to h are given, respectively, by
(B4) (dg/dh)(g/h) = h(g, s)B h(s, h)
(dc/dh)(c/h) = {h(c, s) + h(c, g) h(g, s)B}h(s, h) 39
(dy/dh)(y/h) = ah(s, h) + b
where  h(s, h) =  []     ) h   (s,   - )  s (g, g)   , c h( - B A s h h
b
h(g, s)A = 
g) , c (
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It follows that government's share of expenditure increases provided
h(g, s)Bh(s, h) > ah(s, h) + b
Dividing both sides by h(s, h) and substituting for h(s, h) and h(g, s)A from the formulae
above, we have
h(g, s)Bh(s, h) > a + h(cs, s) - h(ys, s) -h(cs, g)h(g, s)B,
which, recalling that h(ys, s) = a -1, implies
(B5) h(g, s)B > 
g) , c ( - 1





which is the inequality in (16a). 
As noted in the body of the paper, (B5) will hold provided cross effects are strong
relative to own effects in c(s, g).  From (9c), however, we know that cross effects cannot
be too strong if the model is to generate non-boundary equilibria.  It remains to be shown
under what conditions both of these requirements may be satisfied. 
As noted earlier, (9c) will be met provided the AA curve is steeper than the BB
curve at (s*, g*).  An equivalent requirement is that (g, s)A > h(g, s)B.  Therefore, if (B5a)
is met, (9c) will be satisfied provided
g) , c (
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Substituting h(ys, s) = a - 1 this reduces to
g) , c ( - 1






which is the condition given in footnote 24.
From (B4), capital accumulation will increase the share of coordination costs in
total expenditure provided
(B6a) h(c, s) + h(c, g)h(g, s)B > a + bh(s, h)
-1
or, equivalently, 
(B6b) h(g, s)B > 
g) , c ( - g) (c,





The inequality in (B6b) will be satisfied provided c(s, g) is homogeneous of degree
r > 1, which implies
(B7) h(c, s) + h(c, g) = r
h(cs, s) + h(cs, g) = r-1
h(cg, s) + h(cg, g) = r-1
Taken together, the first two lines of (B7) imply
h(c, s) + h(c, g) = 1+ h(cs, s) + h(cs, g)
or
h(c, g) - h(cs, g) = 1+ h(cs, s) - h(c, s),
from which it follows that the right hand side of (B6b) is equal to one.  In addition, from
the third line of (B7) and r > 1, we know
h(cg, s) + h(cg, g) > 0
or
h(cg, s) > -h(cg, g),41
which implies that the right hand side of (B6b) is greater than one, since h(cg, g) is
positive, and thus that (B6b) is satisfied.42
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